$k$th price auctions and Catalan numbers by Nawar, Abdel-Hameed & Sen, Debapriya
ar
X
iv
:1
80
8.
05
99
6v
1 
 [e
co
n.T
H]
  1
7 A
ug
 20
18
kth price auctions and Catalan numbers
Abdel-Hameed Nawar∗ Debapriya Sen†
August 21, 2018
Abstract
This paper establishes an interesting link between kth price auctions and Catalan
numbers by showing that for distributions that have linear density, the bid function
at any symmetric, increasing equilibrium of a kth price auction with k ≥ 3 can be
represented as a finite series of k − 2 terms whose ℓth term involves the ℓth Catalan
number. Using an integral representation of Catalan numbers together with some
classical combinatorial identities, we derive the closed form of the unique symmetric,
increasing equilibrium of a kth price auction for a non-uniform distribution.
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“Catalan numbers: an integer sequence that materializes in unexpected places”
—Martin Gardner (1976)
1 Introduction
In a kth price auction with k or more bidders, the highest bidder wins the object
and pays the kth highest bid as price. This paper establishes an interesting link of
such auctions with Catalan numbers1 by showing that for certain distributions, the
bid function at any symmetric, increasing equilibrium of a kth price auction with
k ≥ 3 can be represented as a finite series involving Catalan numbers. Using an
integral representation of Catalan numbers together with some classical combinatorial
identities, we are then able to characterize equilibrium bids and obtain their bounds.
There are results on the existence of equilibrium for kth price auctions (e.g., Kagel
and Levin, 1993; Monderer and Tennenholtz, 2000), but beyond uniform distributions,
closed form expressions of equilibrium bids are mostly unknown. This paper shows
that Catalan numbers can help us to fill this void.
We consider an independent private value kth price auction with k ≥ 3, in which
there are k or more risk neutral bidders, where values are continuously distributed
in a finite interval. To identify symmetric, increasing equilibrium of this auction, we
follow the approach of appealing to the revenue equivalence principle.2 The revenue
equivalence principle implies that at any symmetric, increasing equilibrium of a kth
price auction, for any value the expected payment of a bidder is the same as its expected
payment in a second-price auction. Given this result, the first step would be to see if
we can find an expression of bid function using the relation on expected payments. If
that can be found, the second step would be to verify if the resulting bid function is
increasing. Provided that is the case, we can conclude that this bid function constitutes
a symmetric equilibrium of the kth price auction.
For a kth price auction with general distributions, the problem of determining the
bid function from the revenue equivalence principle is quite involved. We are able to
find a closed form expression of the bid function for distributions that have a linear
density function, so that its second and higher order derivatives are all zero. For these
distributions, we show that the bid function is a finite series of k − 2 terms whose
ℓth term involves the ℓth Catalan number (Lemma 2, Section 3.1). Building on this
result, we use the integral representation of Catalan numbers derived by Penson and
Sixdeniers (2001), together with the combinatorial identities of Jensen and Hagen-
1Catalan numbers are named after Belgian mathematician Euge`ne Charles Catalan (1814-
1894). Early works in relation to this sequence can be traced back to Mongolian mathemati-
cian Ming’antu (1692-1763). See Pak (2015) for a history and Stanley (2015) for a comprehensive
overview. Also see sequence A000108 of “The On-line Encyclopedia of Integer Sequences” of Sloane:
https://oeis.org/A000108
2Vickrey (1961) introduced independent private value auctions and subsequently (Vickrey, 1962)
established revenue equivalence between first and second price auctions. Riley and Samuelson (1981)
and Myerson (1981) established the revenue equivalence principle. For a comprehensive presentation
of auction theory, see the book of Krishna (2002). There is a small literature on kth price auction
with complete information (e.g., Tauman, 2002; Mathews and Schwartz, 2017).
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Rothe to show that for a specific non-uniform distribution (triangle distribution), the
resulting bid function is increasing. This shows that the strategy profile where all
bidders follow this bid function is the unique symmetric, increasing equilibrium of the
kth price auction (Theorem 1, Section 3.3). We also obtain simple lower and upper
bounds of the equilibrium bid function.
The paper is organized as follows. We present the basic framework of a kth price
auction in Section 2. The analysis of equilibrium bids is presented in Section 3. Some
proofs are presented in the Appendix.
2 The basic framework
The basic framework draws on Chapters 2 and 3 of Krishna (2002). Results that will
be useful for our analysis are summarized here to keep our presentation self contained.
A single object is for sale in an auction. The set of bidders who bid for the object
is N = {1, . . . , n}. For i ∈ N, let Xi be the value of the object for bidder i. Each Xi is
independently and identically distributed (iid) on the interval [0, ω] where 0 < ω <∞,
each having an increasing distribution function F that has a continuous density f ≡ F ′
and has full support. Bidder i knows the realization xi of Xi, but it only knows that
other bidders’ values are iid, each following distribution F. Bidders simultaneously
place bids. An auction is standard if the rules of the auction are such that the highest
bidder wins the object and the payment the winner has to make depends solely on the
submitted bids.
Let n ≥ k ≥ 2. In a kth price auction, the highest bidder wins the object and pays
the kth highest bid. Thus, a kth price auction is a standard auction. A key result that
will be useful for our analysis is the revenue equivalence principle, which holds for any
standard auction (see Proposition 3.1 of Krishna, 2002).
A kth price auction results in a game among the n bidders where the strategy for
bidder i is a function βi : [0, ω] → R+ which determines its bid for any value. A
strategy profile specifies the strategy of each bidder, so it is given by (β1, . . . , βn). A
strategy profile is symmetric if all bidders have the same strategy in that profile. A
symmetric strategy profile is increasing if the common strategy of that profile is an
increasing function.
Fix any bidder: say bidder n. For r = 1, . . . , n − 1, let Yr denote the rth highest
value among the remaining n−1 bidders, that is, Yr is the rth highest order statistic of
X1, . . . , Xn−1. In particular, Y1 = max{X1, . . . , Xn−1}. Denoting by G the distribution
function and g the density function of Y1, we have
G(y) = F (y)n−1 and g(y) = (n− 1)F (y)n−2f(y) (1)
The revenue equivalence principle implies that a symmetric, increasing strategy profile
is an equilibrium of a kth price auction if and only if at that profile, for any value the
expected payment of any bidder is the same as its expected payment in a second price
auction. This result is formally stated in the next proposition.
Proposition 1 For a kth price auction with n risk neutral bidders where n ≥ k ≥ 2,
consider a symmetric, increasing strategy profile at which the common strategy of all
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bidders is the function β : [0, ω] → R+. Denote by m
β(x) the expected payment of a
bidder with value x at this profile. Then (i) mβ(0) = 0 and (ii) this strategy profile is
an equilibrium of the kth price auction if and only if
mβ(x) =
∫ x
0
yg(y)dy (2)
Proof See the Appendix.
Remark 1 Proposition 1 is closely related to Proposition 3.1 of Krishna (2002). The
latter is a more general result which applies to all standard auctions (for example,
they include all-pay-auctions) and there the condition mβ(0) = 0 is an assumption.
Proposition 1 is specific to kth price auctions, which enables us to get mβ(0) = 0 as a
result.
3 Equilibrium of a kth price auction
Consider a symmetric, increasing strategy profile for a kth price auction at which the
common strategy of all bidders is β : [0, ω] → R+. Consider a specific bidder, say
bidder n. Let x ∈ (0, ω]. By the monotonicity of β, when bidder n has value x, at this
strategy profile Pr(bidder n wins) = Pr(Y1 < x) = G(x). As the auction is kth price,
when bidder n wins it has to pay the (k − 1)th highest of the remaining bids. So at
this profile the expected payment of a bidder who has value x is given by
mβ(x) = Pr(Y1 < x)E(β(Yk−1)|Y1 < x) + Pr(Y1 ≥ x)0 = G(x)E(β(Yk−1)|Y1 < x) (3)
For y ≤ x, the density of Yk−1 conditional on Y1 < x is given by
hk−1(y|Y1 < x) =
n− 1
G(x)
(
n− 2
k − 2
)
[F (x)− F (y)]k−2F (y)n−kf(y) (4)
See Lemma A1 in the Appendix for the derivation of the conditional density of order
statistics. Taking m = n− 1 and r = k − 1 there gives (4). By (3) and (4) we have
mβ(x) = G(x)
∫ x
0
β(y)hk−1(y|Y1 < x)dy
= (n− 1)
(
n− 2
k − 2
)∫ x
0
β(y)[F (x)− F (y)]k−2F (y)n−kf(y)dy (5)
Using (1) in (2) of Proposition 1 and by (5), we conclude that for a kth price auction,
a symmetric, increasing strategy profile with common strategy βk : [0, ω] → R+ is an
equilibrium if and only if for all x ∈ [0, ω], the following3 hold:(
n− 2
k − 2
)∫ x
0
βk(y)[F (x)− F (y)]
k−2F (y)n−kf(y)dy =
∫ x
0
yF (y)n−2f(y)dy (6)
3Note that for x = 0, both sides of (6) equal zero.
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Using (6), if we can determine βk and show that it is an increasing function, then we
can conclude that it constitutes a symmetric, increasing equilibrium of the kth price
auction. To this end, denote
φ0(x) :=
∫ x
0
βk(y)[F (x)− F (y)]
k−2F (y)n−kf(y)dy,
ψ0(x) :=
∫ x
0
yF (y)n−2f(y)dy (7)
Then by (6), we have
(
n−2
k−2
)
φ0(x) = ψ0(x). Iteratively define
φt+1(x) :=
φ′t(x)
f(x)
and ψt+1(x) :=
ψ′t(x)
f(x)
for t = 0, 1, . . . (8)
From (6)-(8), it follows that(
n− 2
k − 2
)
φt(x) = ψt(x) for t = 0, 1, . . . (9)
Lemma 1 Let n ≥ 3. For k = 3, . . . , n, the following hold:
φk−1(x) = (k − 2)!βk(x)F (x)
n−k (10)
Proof See the Appendix.
From (9) and (10) it follows that
βk(x) =
ψk−1(x)(
n−2
k−2
)
(k − 2)!F (x)n−k
(11)
Remark 2 Since F ′(x) = f(x), from (7) and (8), we have ψ1(x) = xF (x)
n−2 and
ψ2(x) = x(n− 2)F (x)
n−3 + F (x)n−2/f(x). Then by (11) we have
β2(x) = x, β3(x) = x+
F (x)
(n− 2)f(x)
(12)
As shown in Proposition C of Monderer and Tennenholtz (2000) and Proposition 3.2
of Krishna (2002), if F is log-concave, then F/f is an increasing function and so is
β3. In that case the third price auction has a unique symmetric, increasing equilibrium
where the common strategy of each bidder is β3 given in (12).
In general, for k ≥ 3, we are able to determine ψk−1 for distributions where the
density function f is linear, so that its first derivative is a constant and all derivatives
of second or higher order are zero. For such distributions we obtain a closed form
expression of ψk−1 in terms of Catalan numbers. Using (11), we can then also represent
βk in terms of Catalan numbers.
5
3.1 Bid function in terms of Catalan numbers
For non-negative integers ℓ = 0, 1, . . . , the ℓth Catalan number is given by
Cℓ =
1
ℓ+ 1
(
2ℓ
ℓ
)
(13)
In particular, C0 = C1 = 1. Note that for ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , Catalan numbers satisfy the
recurrence relation
Cℓ =
2(2ℓ− 1)
ℓ+ 1
Cℓ−1 (14)
Let n ≥ 3. For k = 3, . . . , n and ℓ = 0, 1, . . . , k − 3, define
θkℓ :=
(
n− 2
k − 3− ℓ
)
Cℓ
2ℓ
(15)
From (14), the following recurrence relation holds for ℓ = 1, . . . , k − 3:
θk+1ℓ =
2ℓ− 1
ℓ+ 1
θkℓ−1 (16)
Since (n− k + ℓ+ 1)
(
n−2
k−3−ℓ
)
= (k − 2− ℓ)
(
n−2
k−2−ℓ
)
, we have
(n− k + ℓ+ 1)θkℓ = (k − 2− ℓ)θ
k+1
ℓ (17)
The relations (16) and (17) will be useful for our analysis. Now we are in a position to
state the result that represents βk(x) in terms of Catalan numbers.
Lemma 2 Let n ≥ 3. Suppose f ′(x) = a, where a is a constant. Then the following
hold for k = 3, . . . , n:
ψk−1(x)
(k − 2)!
=
(
n− 2
k − 2
)
xF (x)n−k +
k−3∑
ℓ=0
(−1)ℓθkℓ a
ℓF (x)
n−k+ℓ+1
f(x)2ℓ+1
(18)
where θkℓ is given by (15). Consequently, if βk(x) satisfies (11), then
βk(x) = x+
1(
n−2
k−2
) k−3∑
ℓ=0
(−1)ℓθkℓ a
ℓ F (x)
ℓ+1
f(x)2ℓ+1
(19)
Proof Observe that (19) will be immediate from (18) by applying (11). We prove
(18) by induction on k. First let k = 3. Since ψ1(x) = xF (x)
n−2, we have ψ2(x)/0! =
ψ2(x) = ψ
′
1(x)/f(x) = (n− 2)xF (x)
n−3+F (x)n−2/f(x), which equals the right side of
(18) for k = 3 (since θ30 = 1). This shows the result holds for k = 3. In what follows,
we show that if the result holds for k, it also holds for k + 1.
Suppose ψk−1(x)/(k−2)! is given by (18). Denote the two terms on the right side of
(18) by τ1(x), τ2(x). Then ψk−1(x)/(k−2)! = τ1(x)+τ2(x). Since ψk(x) = ψ
′
k−1(x)/f(x),
we have
ψk(x)
(k − 1)!
=
τ ′1(x) + τ
′
2(x)
(k − 1)f(x)
(20)
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Note from (18) that
τ ′1(x)
f(x)
=
(
n− 2
k − 2
)
x(n− k)F (x)n−k−1 +
(
n− 2
k − 2
)
F (x)n−k
f(x)
= (k − 1)
(
n− 2
k − 1
)
xF (x)n−k−1 + θk+10
F (x)n−k
f(x)
(21)
Now consider the second term of (18). Since f ′(x) = a, we have
τ ′2(x)
f(x)
=
k−3∑
ℓ=0
(−1)ℓθkℓ a
ℓ (n− k + ℓ+ 1)F (x)
n−k+ℓ
f(x)2ℓ+1
+
k−3∑
ℓ=0
(−1)ℓθkℓ a
ℓ+1 (−1)(2ℓ+ 1)F (x)
n−k+ℓ+1
f(x)2ℓ+3
Note from (17) that (n − k + ℓ + 1)θkℓ = (k − 2 − ℓ)θ
k+1
ℓ . Using this and denoting
j = ℓ+ 1 in the second sum of above, the expression above equals
k−3∑
ℓ=0
(−1)ℓ(k − 2− ℓ)θk+1ℓ a
ℓF (x)
n−k+ℓ
f(x)2ℓ+1
+
k−2∑
j=1
(−1)j(2j − 1)θkj−1a
jF (x)
n−k+j
f(x)2j+1
By (16), (k− 2− ℓ)θk+1ℓ + (2ℓ− 1)θ
k
ℓ−1 = (k− 1)θ
k+1
ℓ . Using this, the expression above
equals
(k − 2)θk+10
F (x)n−k
f(x)
+ (k − 1)
k−3∑
ℓ=1
(−1)ℓθk+1ℓ a
ℓF (x)
n−k+ℓ
f(x)2ℓ+1
+(−1)k−2(2k − 5)θkk−3a
k−2 F (x)
n−2
f(x)2k−3
Taking ℓ = k−2 in (16), we have (2k−5)θkk−3 = (k−1)θ
k+1
k−2. Using this in the expression
above, we have
τ ′2(x)
f(x)
= (k − 2)θk+10
F (x)n−k
f(x)
+ (k − 1)
k−2∑
ℓ=1
(−1)ℓθk+1ℓ a
ℓF (x)
n−k+ℓ
f(x)2ℓ+1
(22)
From (20), (21) and (22), we have
ψk(x)
(k − 1)!
=
(
n− 2
k − 1
)
xF (x)n−k−1 +
k−2∑
ℓ=0
(−1)ℓθk+1ℓ a
ℓF (x)
n−k+ℓ
f(x)2ℓ+1
This shows if the result holds for k, it also holds for k + 1. Since the result holds for
k = 3, we conclude that the result holds for all k = 3, . . . , n.
Remark 3 On the basis of Lemma 2, we cannot conclude that βk obtained in (19)
constitutes an equilibrium of the kth price auction. Such a conclusion can be made
only when the resulting βk is an increasing function. Consider the case of a uniform
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distribution on [0, ω]. Then F (x) = x/ω, f(x) = 1/ω and f ′(x) = 0. Taking a = 0 in
(19) and using (15), in that case we have
βk(x) = x+
1(
n−2
k−2
) θk0F (x)
f(x)
= x+
(
n−2
k−3
)(
n−2
k−2
)x = x+ k − 2
n− k + 1
x (23)
Since βk given in (23) is indeed an increasing function for n ≥ k ≥ 2, we conclude that
when values are iid and uniformly distributed, then the strategy profile with common
strategy βk given by (23) is the unique symmetric increasing equilibrium of the kth
price auction. This result was obtained in Kagel and Levin (1993, p.878).
Since F (0) = 0, the general form of distribution function on [0, ω] that has f ′(x) = a
is F (x) = ax2/2 + bx. For non-uniform distributions (i.e., a 6= 0), we are able to
verify monotonicity of βk given in (19) (and consequently conclude βk constitutes an
equilibrium of the kth price auction) for distributions where b = 0, that is, when F (x) =
ax2/2.We obtain this result by two key techniques: (i) using an integral representation
of Catalan numbers and (ii) applying some classical combinatorial identities. Let us
first state the results on Catalan numbers and combinatorics that will be used in our
analysis.
3.2 Results on Catalan numbers and combinatorics
Catalan numbers have the following integral representation (see equation (10) of Penson
and Sixdeniers, 2001):
Cℓ =
1
2π
∫
4
0
uℓ
√
4− u
u
du =
22ℓ+1
π
∫
1
0
tℓ
√
1− t
t
dt (24)
where the second equality follows by substituting t = u/4.
Now we state three fundamental combinatorial identities. For our purpose, in all of
these identities, s is any non-negative integer, m is any positive real number and r, z
are any real numbers. The first is Jensen’s identity (see equation (4.1) of Gould and
Quaintance, 2010; equation (1) of Guo, 2011):
s∑
ℓ=0
(
m+ zℓ
ℓ
)(
r − zℓ
s− ℓ
)
=
s∑
ℓ=0
(
m+ r − ℓ
s− ℓ
)
zℓ (25)
The second is Hagen-Rothe’s identity (see equation (17) of Gould, 1956; equation (2)
of Chu, 2010):4
s∑
ℓ=0
m
m+ zℓ
(
m+ zℓ
ℓ
)(
r − zℓ
s− ℓ
)
=
(
m+ r
s
)
(26)
The third identity is related to Jensen’s identity (see the first equation in p.204, Guo,
2011):
s∑
ℓ=0
(
r − ℓ
s− ℓ
)
zℓ =
s∑
ℓ=0
(
r + 1
s− ℓ
)
(z − 1)ℓ (27)
4Gould (1956) proves a more general result. Taking p = y, q = −β in equation (17) of Gould
(1956) gives the identity of (26).
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3.3 Equilibrium for a non-uniform distribution
Let F (x) = ax2/2, where a is a positive constant. Then f(x) = ax and f ′(x) = a > 0,
so the condition of Lemma 2 holds. In this case we have aℓF (x)ℓ+1/f(x)2ℓ+1 = (1/2)ℓ+1x
and by (19) it follows that
βk(x) = x+
x(
n−2
k−2
) k−3∑
ℓ=0
(−1)ℓ
θkℓ
2ℓ+1
(28)
Thus in this case βk(x) is linear with βk(0) = 0. We show that the function βk is
increasing and therefore it is an equilibrium of the kth price auction. We show that
the function βk is increasing and therefore it is an equilibrium of the kth price auction.
Theorem 1 Let n ≥ 3 and k = 3, . . . , n. Consider a kth price auction with n risk
neutral bidders. Suppose values are iid on [0, ω] with distribution function F (x) = ax2/2
where a > 0. Then the following hold.
(i) The strategy profile where each bidder has the common strategy βk : [0, ω] → R+
given by (28) is the unique symmetric, increasing equilibrium of the kth price
auction.
(ii) If n is sufficiently large compared to k (specifically, n+ 4 > 2k), then
x+
k − 2
2(n− 2)
x ≤ βk(x) ≤ x+
7(k − 2)
8(n− 2)
x (29)
Proof (i) Since for F (x) = ax2/2, the function βk given in (28) is the unique solution
to (11), if we can show βk is an increasing function, it will prove that the unique
symmetric, increasing equilibrium of the kth price auction has the common strategy
βk for each bidder. To show this, denote
Ωk :=
k−3∑
ℓ=0
(−1)ℓ
θkℓ
2ℓ+1
=
k−3∑
ℓ=0
(−1)ℓ
(
n− 2
k − 3− ℓ
)
Cℓ
22ℓ+1
(30)
Note from (28) that
βk(x) = x+
x(
n−2
k−2
)Ωk (31)
Using the integral representation (24) in (30) and then making the transformation
z = 1− t, we have
Ωk =
1
π
k−3∑
ℓ=0
(
n− 2
k − 3− ℓ
)[∫
1
0
(−t)ℓ
√
1− t
t
dt
]
=
1
π
k−3∑
ℓ=0
(
n− 2
k − 3− ℓ
)[∫
1
0
(z − 1)ℓ
√
z
1− z
dz
]
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Switching the orders of summation and integration we have
Ωk =
1
π
∫
1
0
√
z
1− z
[
k−3∑
ℓ=0
(
n− 2
k − 3− ℓ
)
(z − 1)ℓ
]
dz (32)
Taking r = n− 3, s = k − 3 in (27) we have
k−3∑
ℓ=0
(
n− 2
k − 3− ℓ
)
(z − 1)ℓ =
k−3∑
ℓ=0
(
n− 3− ℓ
k − 3− ℓ
)
zℓ (33)
By (32) and (33) we have
Ωk =
1
π
∫
1
0
√
z
1− z
[
k−3∑
ℓ=0
(
n− 3− ℓ
k − 3− ℓ
)
zℓ
]
dz (34)
Since n ≥ k ≥ 3, the sum on the right side of (33) is positive for all z ∈ (0, 1). So by (34),
Ωk is also positive. Then by (31) it follows that βk is an increasing function, which
proves that the strategy profile with common strategy βk is the unique symmetric,
increasing equilibrium of the kth price auction.
(ii) First note that for k = 3, the inequalities of (29) are immediate from (12)
(in fact, for k = 3, the lower bound of (29) holds with equality). So let n ≥ 4 and
k = 4, . . . , n. Taking s = k−3, r = n−3−m in (25) (Jensen’s identity) for any m > 0
we have
k−3∑
ℓ=0
(
n− 3− ℓ
k − 3− ℓ
)
zℓ =
k−3∑
ℓ=0
(
m+ zℓ
ℓ
)(
n− 3−m− zℓ
k − 3− ℓ
)
(35)
For z ∈ [0, 1], let δ(z) := (k− 3)(1− z)− 1 and η(z) := n− 2− (k− 3)z. If n+4 > 2k,
then η(1) = n−k+1 > δ(0)+1 = k−3 > 0. Fix m ∈ (δ(0)+1, η(1)). Since δ(z) ≤ δ(0)
and η(1) ≤ η(z), for such m, we have δ(z) < m < η(z) for all z ∈ [0, 1]. We can express
each term of the right side of (35) using the the gamma function as follows (note that
Γ(t) > 0 for all t > 0):(
m+ zℓ
ℓ
)
=
Γ(m+ zℓ + 1)
Γ(ℓ+ 1)Γ(m− (1− z)ℓ + 1)
and
(
n− 3−m− zℓ
k − 3− ℓ
)
=
Γ(n− 2−m− zℓ)
Γ(k − 2− ℓ)Γ(n− k −m+ (1− z)ℓ + 1)
(36)
For all ℓ = 0, 1, . . . , k−3, we have m−(1−z)ℓ+1 ≥ m−(1−z)(k−3)+1 = m−δ(z) > 0
and hence Γ(m−(1−z)ℓ+1) > 0.We also have n−2−m−zℓ ≥ n−2−m−z(k−3) =
η(z) −m > 0 and hence Γ(n − 2 −m − zℓ) > 0. Finally n − k −m + (1 − z)ℓ + 1 ≥
n− k + 1−m = η(1)−m > 0 and hence Γ(n− k−m+ (1− z)ℓ+ 1) > 0. This shows
that for fixed m ∈ (δ(0) + 1, η(1)), every term in the sum of the right side of (35) is
positive for all z ∈ [0, 1]. So we have
k−3∑
ℓ=0
(
m+ zℓ
ℓ
)(
n− 3−m− zℓ
k − 3− ℓ
)
=
k−3∑
ℓ=0
m+ zℓ
m+ zℓ
(
m+ zℓ
ℓ
)(
n− 3−m− zℓ
k − 3− ℓ
)
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≤k−3∑
ℓ=0
m+ z(k − 3)
m+ zℓ
(
m+ zℓ
ℓ
)(
n− 3−m− zℓ
k − 3− ℓ
)
=
[
m+ z(k − 3)
m
] k−3∑
ℓ=0
m
m+ zℓ
(
m+ zℓ
ℓ
)(
n− 3−m− zℓ
k − 3− ℓ
)
=
[
1 +
z(k − 3)
m
](
n− 3
k − 3
)
< (1 + z)
(
n− 3
k − 3
)
(37)
where the second last equality follows by taking s = k − 3 and r = n− 3−m in (26)
(Hagen-Rothe’s identity) and the last inequality follows by noting that m > δ(0)+1 =
k − 3. Thus (37) gives an upper bound for the sum of (35). Similarly we can obtain a
lower bound for the sum by noting that
k−3∑
ℓ=0
(
m+ zℓ
ℓ
)(
n− 3−m− zℓ
k − 3− ℓ
)
=
k−3∑
ℓ=0
m+ zℓ
m+ zℓ
(
m+ zℓ
ℓ
)(
n− 3−m− zℓ
k − 3− ℓ
)
≥
k−3∑
ℓ=0
m
m+ zℓ
(
m+ zℓ
ℓ
)(
n− 3−m− zℓ
k − 3− ℓ
)
=
(
n− 3
k − 3
)
(38)
where the last equality again follows by (26). Using the bounds from (37)-(38), by (34)
and (35) we have(
n−3
k−3
)
π
∫
1
0
√
z
1− z
dz ≤ Ωk ≤
(
n−3
k−3
)
π
∫
1
0
(1 + z)
√
z
1− z
dz
Noting that
∫
1
0
√
z/(1 − z)dz = π/2 and
∫
1
0
(1 + z)
√
z/(1− z)dz = 7π/8, it follows
that
1
2
(
n− 3
k − 3
)
≤ Ωk ≤
7
8
(
n− 3
k − 3
)
(39)
Since
(
n−3
k−3
)
/
(
n−2
k−2
)
= (k−2)/(n−2), the result of (29) follows by applying the inequalities
of (39) in (31).
Appendix
Lemma A1 (Conditional density of order statistics) Suppose X1, . . . , Xm are iid
random variables on the interval [0, ω], each having an increasing distribution function
F that has a continuous density f ≡ F ′ and has full support. Denote by Yr the rth
highest order statistic of X1, . . . , Xm. Let x > 0 and y ≤ x. Then for r = 1, . . . , m, the
density of Yr conditional on Y1 < x is
hr(y|Y1 < x) =
m
G(x)
(
m− 1
r − 1
)
[F (x)− F (y)]r−1F (y)m−rf(y) (40)
where G is the distribution function of Y1.
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Proof Denote by Hr the distribution function of Yr conditional on Y1 < x, that is,
Hr(y|Y1 < x) = Pr(Yr ≤ y|Y1 < x) =
Pr(Yr ≤ y, Y1 < x)
Pr(Y1 < x)
=
Pr(Yr ≤ y, Y1 < x)
G(x)
(41)
The event (Yr ≤ y) is the union of r mutually exclusive events as follows:
(Yr ≤ y) = (Yr ≤ y < Yr−1) ∪ (Yr−1 ≤ y < Yr−2) ∪ . . . ∪ (Y2 ≤ y < Y1) ∪ (Y1 ≤ y)
= [∪r−1t=1 (Yt+1 ≤ y < Yt)] ∪ (Y1 ≤ y)
Since y ≤ x, we have (Y1 ≤ y, Y1 < x) = (Y1 ≤ y), so that
(Yr ≤ y, Y1 < x) = [∪
r−1
t=1 (Yt+1 ≤ y < Yt, Y1 < x)] ∪ (Y1 ≤ y)
Hence
Pr(Yr ≤ y, Y1 < x) =
r−1∑
t=1
Pr(Yt+1 ≤ y < Yt, Y1 < x) + Pr(Y1 ≤ y) (42)
Noting that
(Yt+1 ≤ y < Yt, Y1 < x) = (y < Yj < x for j = 1, . . . , t; Yj ≤ y for j = t+ 1, . . . , m)
we have
Pr(Yt+1 ≤ y < Yt, Y1 < x) =
(
m
t
)
[F (x)− F (y)]tF (y)m−t (43)
Since Pr(Y1 ≤ y) = F (y)
m, by (41), (42) and (43) we have
G(x)Hr(y|Y1 < x) = Pr(Yr ≤ y, Y1 < x) =
r−1∑
t=0
(
m
t
)
[F (x)− F (y)]tF (y)m−t (44)
Note that the conditional density hr(y|Y1 < x) is the derivative of the conditional
distribution function Hr(y|Y1 < x) with respect to y. Also note that F
′(y) = f(y). So
from (44) we have
G(x)hr(y|Y1 < x) =
d
dy
r−1∑
t=0
(
m
t
)
[F (x)− F (y)]tF (y)m−t
=
r−1∑
t=0
(
m
t
)
[F (x)−F (y)]t(m−t)F (y)m−t−1f(y)−
r−1∑
t=1
(
m
t
)
t[F (x)−F (y)]t−1f(y)F (y)m−t
= mf(y)
r−1∑
t=0
(
m− 1
t
)
[F (x)−F (y)]tF (y)m−1−t−mf(y)
r−1∑
t=1
(
m− 1
t− 1
)
[F (x)−F (y)]t−1F (y)m−t
= mf(y)
r−1∑
t=0
(
m− 1
t
)
[F (x)−F (y)]tF (y)m−1−t−mf(y)
r−2∑
j=0
(
m− 1
j
)
[F (x)−F (y)]jF (y)m−1−j
= m
(
m− 1
r − 1
)
[F (x)− F (y)]r−1F (y)m−rf(y)
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This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 1 (i) Consider a specific bidder, say bidder n. By the mono-
tonicity of β it follows that at this strategy profile when bidder n has value x, it wins
the object if and only if Y1 < x, so Pr(1 wins) = Pr(Y1 < x) = G(x). Since G(0) = 0,
when bidder n has value 0, it wins with probability zero. Since a bidder makes no
payment if it does not win, we conclude that mβ(0) = 0.
(ii) For z ∈ [0, ω], denote by m˜β(z, x) the expected payment of bidder n when
bidder n has value x and it bids b = β(z) while all other bidders follow the strategy β
(note that m˜β(x, x) = mβ(x)). By the monotonicity of β, in this case bidder n wins if
and only if Y1 < z, so Pr(bidder n wins) = Pr(Y1 < z) = G(z).
First let z = 0. Since G(0) = 0, in this case bidder n wins with probability zero.
Since a bidder makes no payment if it does not win, we have m˜β(0, x) = 0. Note that
m˜β(0, x) does not depend on bidder n’s value x, so we have m˜β(0, x) = m˜β(0, 0) =
mβ(0) = 0.
Next consider z > 0. As the auction is kth price, in the event bidder n wins, it has
to pay the (k − 1)-th highest of the remaining bids, so we have
m˜β(z, x) = Pr(Y1 < z)E(β(Yk−1)|Y1 < z) + Pr(Y1 ≥ z)0 = G(z)E(β(Yk−1)|Y1 < z)
Again observe that m˜β(z, x) does not depend on bidder n’s value x, so we have
m˜β(z, x) = m˜β(z, z) = mβ(z).
Denote by πβ(z, x) the expected payoff of bidder n when bidder n has value x and
it bids b = β(z) while all other bidders follow the strategy β. Since m˜β(z, x) = mβ(z),
we have
πβ(z, x) = G(z)x− m˜β(z, x) = G(z)x−mβ(z) (45)
We prove (ii) by using (45).
Proof of the “if part” of (ii) Suppose the strategy profile where all bidders
have the common strategy β is an equilibrium. Then for any x ∈ (0, ω), we must have
πβ(x, x) ≥ πβ(z, x) for all z ∈ [0, ω]. So the following first-order condition must hold:
∂πβ(z, x)
∂z
[z = x] = 0
Note from (45) that ∂πβ(z, x)/∂z = g(z)x−dmβ(z)/dz. Then by the first order condi-
tion, for all y ∈ (0, ω) we have g(y)y = dmβ(y)/dy. Hence
∫ x
0
yg(y)dy = mβ(x)−mβ(0).
Then (2) follows by noting that mβ(0) = 0.
Proof of the “only if part” of (ii) To prove the “only if part”, suppose the
strategy profile where all bidders have the common strategy β satisfies (2). At this
profile, for any x ∈ [0, ω], a bidder who has value x obtains expected payoff πβ(x, x). If
this bidder unilaterally deviates and bids b = β(z) for some z ∈ [0, ω], it would obtain
πβ(z, x). By (45) and (2) we have
πβ(x, x)− πβ(z, x) = x[G(x)−G(z)]−
∫ x
0
yg(y)dy +
∫ z
0
yg(y)dy
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Integration by parts gives
∫ t
0
yg(y)dy = tG(t)−
∫ t
0
G(y)dy. So we have
πβ(x, x)− πβ(z, x) = −xG(z) +
∫ x
0
G(y)dy + zG(z) −
∫ z
0
G(y)dy (46)
Note that G is non-decreasing. If z ≥ x, then by (46) we have
πβ(x, x)− πβ(z, x) = (z − x)G(z) −
∫ z
x
G(y)dy ≥ (z − x)G(z)−
∫ z
x
G(z)dy = 0
If z < x, then by (46) we have
πβ(x, x)− πβ(z, x) =
∫ x
z
G(y)dy − (x− z)G(z) ≥
∫ x
z
G(z)dy − (x− z)G(z) = 0
Thus πβ(x, x) ≥ πβ(z, x) for all z ∈ [0, ω]. This shows any unilateral deviation to a bid
b where b = β(z) for some z ∈ [0, ω] is not gainful.
If a bidder with value x unilaterally deviates to a bid b < β(0), then the probability
that it will win is zero and its expected payoff is also zero. Since πβ(x, x) ≥ πβ(0, x) = 0,
such a deviation is not gainful. Finally if a bidder with value x unilaterally deviates
to a bid b > β(ω), then its expected payment is Pr(β(Y1) < b)E(β(Yk−1)|β(Y1) < b).
Since b > β(ω) and Pr(Y1 < ω) = G(ω) = 1, we have Pr(β(Y1) < b) = G(ω) = 1
and E(β(Yk−1)|β(Y1) < b) = E(β(Yk−1)|Y1 < ω). This shows its expected payment is
mβ(ω) and expected payoff is πβ(ω, x). Since πβ(x, x) ≥ πβ(ω, x), such a deviation is
also not gainful.
This proves that if an increasing, symmetric strategy profile with common strategy
β satisfies (2), then this profile is an equilibrium.
The following lemma will be useful to prove Lemma 1.
Lemma A2 Let n ≥ k ≥ 3. For t = 2, . . . , k and ℓ = 0, 1, . . . , k − t, let λℓ,t :=
(
k−t
ℓ
)
,
γℓ(x) :=
∫ x
0
βk(y)F (y)
n−k+ℓf(y)dy,Φt(x) :=
k−t∑
ℓ=0
(−1)ℓλℓ,tF (x)
k−t−ℓγℓ(x) (47)
Then for t = 2, . . . , k − 1, the following hold: Φ′t(x)/f(x) = (k − t)Φt+1(x).
Proof Note that F ′(x) = f(x). Also note that since γ′ℓ(x) = βk(x)F (x)
n−k+ℓf(x), we
have F (x)k−t−ℓγ′ℓ(x)/f(x) = βk(x)F (x)
n−t. Using these, by (47) we have
Φ′t(x)
f(x)
=
k−t−1∑
ℓ=0
(−1)ℓλℓ,t(k − t− ℓ)F (x)
k−t−ℓ−1γℓ(x)
+βk(x)F (x)
n−t
k−t−1∑
ℓ=0
(−1)ℓλℓ,t + (−1)
k−tλk−t,tβk(x)F (x)
n−t
Since (k − t− ℓ)λℓ,t = (k − t)λℓ,t+1 the expression above equals
(k − t)
k−t−1∑
ℓ=0
(−1)ℓλℓ,t+1F (x)
k−t−1−ℓγℓ(x) + βk(x)F (x)
n−t
k−t∑
ℓ=0
(−1)ℓλℓ,t
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The result follows by noting that the first sum above is (k − t)Φt+1(x) and the second
sum is zero.
Proof of Lemma 1 Recall that
φ0(x) :=
∫ x
0
βk(y)[F (x)− F (y)]
k−2F (y)n−kf(y)dy
So we have
φ0(x) =
∫ x
0
βk(y)
[
k−2∑
ℓ=0
(−1)ℓ
(
k − 2
ℓ
)
F (y)ℓF (x)k−2−ℓ
]
F (y)n−kf(y)dy
Changing the order of summation and integration, noting that λℓ,t =
(
k−t
ℓ
)
, and using
the functions γℓ(x),Φt(x) from (47), we have
φ0(x) =
k−2∑
ℓ=0
(−1)ℓλℓ,2F (x)
k−2−ℓγℓ(x) = Φ2(x)
Using Lemma A2, we have φ1(x) = φ
′
0(x)/f(x) = Φ
′
2(x)/f(x) = (k − 2)Φ3(x). Again
applying Lemma A2: φ2(x) = φ
′
1(x)/f(x) = (k − 2)Φ
′
3(x)/f(x) = (k− 2)(k− 3)Φ4(x).
Using this reasoning after k − 2 steps gives
φk−2(x) = (k − 2)× . . .× 1× Φk(x) = (k − 2)!Φk(x)
Note by (47) that Φk(x) = γ0(x) =
∫ x
0
βk(y)F (y)
n−kf(y)dy. This implies Φ′k(x) =
γ′0(x) = βk(x)F (x)
n−kf(x). Hence φk−1(x) = φ
′
k−2(x)/f(x) = (k − 2)!Φ
′
k(x)/f(x) =
(k − 2)!βk(x)F (x)
n−k.
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